NATO is not obsolete, but it does need to evolve; Russia still poses a prominent potential threat to Europe's eastern flank, and every terrorist attack that hits the Continent shows the need for better security and intelligence coordination. Still, the United States will continue to carry a heavier burden than the rest, and Eastern European allies will have to look beyond NATO for bilateral security guarantees from Washington to fortify their shield against Russia. The announcement of a third U.S. brigade rotating through Eastern Europe does not fundamentally alter the military balance between NATO and Russia unless European member states can match those levels. But quieter U.S. deployments in Iceland, as Russian submarine activity in the Atlantic Ocean rises, to reinforce the "GIUK gap" (between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom) point to a more comprehensive buildup by the United States, even if it is incremental.
A Dissection of Russian Strategy
The gradual U.S. buildup in Europe ensures that the U.S.-Russian standoff will be a major theme of the next U.S. presidency. Russia's fundamental distrust of the United States is fueled by what it perceives as a deliberate Western encroachment on its doorstep. Moscow will try to mitigate the threat with a conventional military buildup as well as a distancing and possible break from previous nuclear arms-control treaties. Russia will also do its best to widen fissures in Europe to undermine both financial sanctions and overall U.S. efforts to build a strong and coherent counterbalance to potential Russian aggression.
The third prong in Russia's strategy entails finding and building levers in conflict zones that have the potential not only to bog the United States down but also to make the United States dependent on Moscow for an exit strategy. The Middle East is full of such opportunities, with Syria being the most prominent example. Russia is so entrenched in that conflict that it can either dial up or down the violence to shape its broader negotiation with the West. The stick comes in the form of intensifying the conflict through its military support for the Bashar al Assad government, which in turn exacerbates the migrant crisis dividing Europe and stymies U.S. efforts on the battlefield. The carrot comes in the form of implementing a cease-fire, coordinating on the fight against the Islamic State and working toward a credible peace deal and political transition with the expectation that the Europeans and the United States will be willing to bargain on sanctions relief, put pressure on Ukraine to recognize autonomy in its east and limit the NATO buildup. Tactical and incremental compromises are possible as both sides try to avoid a bigger conflagration, but Russia's standoff with the West is still deeply ingrained and, with the credibility of U.S. security guarantees at stake, the United States is unlikely to make compromises that leave its allies hanging. As the conflict endures, the U.S. president must stay alert to the layers of Russian strategy designed to draw Washington into strategic concessions at the expense of those allies.
Navigating growing competition between Russia and Turkey will be tricky for Washington. From the Middle East to the Black Sea region to Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus, there are multiple opportunities for Moscow and Ankara to bump heads. The United States can leverage this competition to draw Turkey deeper into the NATO fold, but it must also be wary of being drawn into a fray between these old geopolitical rivals that could undermine the alliance and escalate into much bigger confrontations.
Get Used to Regional Powers Stepping Up in the Mideast
Power vacuums in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen overlaid by deep sectarian tensions will provide space for jihadists to operate and a base from which grassroots operatives can draw inspiration, training and expertise. Whether those jihadist pockets will thrive depends on the ability of the United States to attract more regional help with counterterrorism efforts. This dynamic is already in play, as a U.S. strategy to reconcile with Iran has had the strategic effect of prodding the main Sunni players - Turkey and Saudi Arabia - into action to counterbalance Iran. The cost to this balance-of-power strategy is that all players and their proxies will pull in multiple and often opposing directions in pursuing their immediate interests. But after more than a decade of fighting in the Middle East, U.S. policymakers should be used to working with a dizzying array of competing factions. The United States will have to bend with the strategies of its allies - and in some cases, allies will have to bend with the strategy of the United States. For example, the United States will continue to work with Kurdish militant proxies against the Islamic State but will also set boundaries as it prioritizes cooperation with Turkey. Israel will see its influence on the U.S. policy in the region weaken as Washington is forced to rely on other regional heavyweights to manage these conflicts, but Israel will be quick to adapt by quietly building its own ties to Sunni partners and by keeping on top of Russian activities in the region.
