realclearworld Newsletters: Europe Memo
In the aftermath of a sweeping electoral victory by Poland's right-wing Law and Justice party, or PiS, led by the controversial politician Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the international press has been far from optimistic about the implications for Europe of Poland's new leadership. Slate's Joshua Keating says a euroskeptic party has upended Polish politics. Judy Dempsey muses on the country's euroskeptic future. Jan Cienski expects Brussels to find that Warsaw will be harder to work with, while the Guardian's Remi Adekoya breathlessly remarks that the election could even work to Russian President Vladimir Putin's favor.
So is a wave of euroskepticism sweeping over this most crucial of Central European nations? The answer is, not likely. We asked Stratfor regional director and RealClearWorld contributor Antonia Colibasanu, and Michal Baranowski, the director of the German Marshall Fund's Warsaw office, to delve into the implications for Warsaw's foreign policy of Poland's election. Answers have been slightly edited for clarity:
RCW: Post-election, how do you feel about the nature of eurosckepticism in Poland? Are we seeing the emergence of real euroskeptic forces there, or can we just expect Poland to be more assertive at EU forums?
Colibasanu: Euroskepticism in Poland is linked to the economic performance of that country post-2008, and the social problems associated with that. Poland has seen a growing disenchantment with the EU -- Poland had a big population outflow after 2004, and the economic growth that followed immediately after accession is perceived to have been unequally distributed. Young people are working mostly on temporary contracts, so the benefits of the EU are just not much perceived, considering everything.
PiS has campaigned on bringing growth back to Poland, and one of the key issues that they have insisted on is protecting the country against any negative effects coming from any measures that the eurozone might design. So yes, Poland is likely to become more assertive in the EU, not only when discussing the refugee crisis.
While the topic presents concerns and seems to be leading to increased euroskepticism, Poland understands the opportunity presented by EU funding, this being one of the reasons for its aggressive negotiating posture. Most importantly Warsaw will press for more protection for non-eurozone countries, and for supporting energy diversification.
Baranowski: Poland remains one of the most pro-European countries in the EU. In fact, the win of PiS had very little to do with foreign policy or with Poland's European vocation. The new government is likely to place a smaller value on staying within the European mainstream, but it doesn't meant that it's going to be anti-European. I would expect the new government to be more assertive and vocal in pursuing the national interest, but without any appetite for starting unnecessary fights in Brussels.
RCW: PiS says it will emphasize "region, region, region." What does that mean in practice, or how might this play out? Projecting long-term, how could the EU be undermined by it, and how could it actually benefit?
Colibasanu: It is very likely that Poland will work to increase cooperation within the Visegrad group [composed of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic]. They will press the EU on common goals, especially on supporting protective measures for the countries' economies.
It is also likely that cooperation with Romania will increase, and Poland will seek to emphasize more practical issues to support what is now just a framework strategic partnership. Regional security imperatives will drive this: The cooperation with Romania will come mostly on defense matters, also taking into account the strategic partnership that both countries have with the United States, as well as current regional developments. Establishing coordination and interoperability among armed forces within NATO, and in coordination with the United States, is the long-term goal. The Visegrad group will focus more on coordinating common positions within the EU, tackling mostly socio-economic problems, even if cooperation in the defense and security sphere will be discussed occasionally.
The EU is not necessarily undermined, nor does it necessarily benefit -- Poland will seek to maintain its active role within the EU, and to assert a leadership role in the Central European region. Its priorities relate to Poland's own national security imperatives. More regional cohesion on economic and defense issues can either reinforce the EU integration process, or it can underline the divide in a two-speed Europe -- in other words, the divide between eurozone and non-eurozone countries.
Baranowski: The new government will likely search for its power-base in the region -- especially along the Baltic Sea-Black Sea axis -- rather than through close ties with the big three (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom). The first test of this approach will be a meeting in Bucharest, where the presidents of the countries along NATO's eastern flank will meet to discuss the agenda of the NATO summit in Warsaw, which is scheduled for July 2016. The group is far from uniform, but if this approach works, it will become the modus operandi of the new government.
RCW: In the short-term, how will Poland's stance on refugee quotas change, or just its rhetoric? How can both sides keep it from escalating to an all-out confrontation?
Colibasanu: Poland will continue to oppose the introduction of a system of automatic distribution of asylum seekers in Europe. Warsaw will probably accept some asylum seekers as a gesture of goodwill, but Poland will oppose any measures meant to introduce an automatic system for their redistribution.
Baranowski: This is indeed a difficult question - it was difficult for the [outgoing ruling party] Civic Platform, or PO, and it will be even more difficult for the PiS government. I don't expect the position of Poland to change anytime soon. In fact, I think the new government will have to emphasize the issue of tightening the external borders of the EU as part of the solution.
RCW: Jeroen Dijsselbloem this week issued the bluntest of threats:
Dijsselbloem said that Poland should show something in return for Europe's largesse. "And if not, we could take a part of the EU's budget that flows to countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in the form of subsidies and use that money to help Turkey pay for the shelter it provides to refugees within its borders," Dijsselbloem was quoted as saying.
"You're in the European Union for better and for worse," the Eurogroup chairman added. "You can't just enjoy the benefits and walk away from the disadvantages when it suits you."
How will this play in Poland?
Colibasanu: Poland needs to be assertive in protecting its own interests -- the current government, judging by their campaign platform, is likely to support more state intervention in the economy, which, in turn, is likely not to be much appreciated by Brussels.
At the same time, while Poland says it will join the eurozone, it remains unclear when that will happen. However, while Poland will likely support the United Kingdom's call for more national sovereignty, Warsaw needs the EU to deal with Russia: not only when it comes to maintaining some of the sanctions, but also regarding the energy union project, which Poland would like implemented for the sake of diminishing dependency on Russia. There is no way that Poland will seek to exit the EU, nor will it refuse to share the burden -- but it will negotiate its stance and be assertive in supporting its national interests.
Baranowski: Unsurprisingly, it won't play very well in Warsaw. As I mentioned before, it's going to be a difficult issue, also for the new government, but the solution is an open conversation and compromise, rather than an open threat coming from the Brussels or specific member states.
RCW: Projecting forward, what effect could a confront-Russia axis led by Poland have on EU politics?
Baranowski: I don't think that Poland will lead an anti-Russia axis. There is a legitimate concern in Poland, and other states bordering or near Russia, about the real security threat coming from the east. Over the past year and half, Russia attacked and annexed part of a territory of a sovereign state, Ukraine; conducted massive military exercises on the EU borders; and officially designated NATO as an adversary. I think the new Polish government will continue to make the case that in order to have a peaceful situation in the East, NATO will have to provide an effective deterrent. This stand would be very much a continuation of the PO-led government.
RCW: How does the election affect the way Poland manages its key relationships, and which are those? How much change does the election of PiS bring, really?
Colibasanu: On foreign policy matters, things will really not change much. Poland will continue its close cooperation with the United States and NATO; it will pressure the EU to keep sanctions on Russia; it will work to enhance cooperation within Visegrad and with Romania (the latter particularly on the defense side). What will likely be new is the fact that Poland will probably support British calls for more sovereignty, in the sense that it will support proposals that seek to protect non-eurozone countries from measures designed by the eurozone.
Around the Continent
Brexit update: British Prime Minister David Cameron finally joined the fray this week, breaking his relative silence on the Brexit debate to point out the disadvantages of the much-ballyhooed "Norway Model" for the United Kingdom. Said Cameron, quoted by Reuters:
"Norway actually pays as much per head to the EU as we do, they actually take twice as many per head migrants as we do in this country, but of course they have no seat at the table, no ability to negotiate."
Reuters continued:
"[Norway] accepts the EU's principles of freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people as well as rules governing, among other things, employment law and competition. It also contributes hundreds of millions of euros to the EU budget.
"British and EU officials highlighted Britain's current power to shape EU rules when the EU executive unveiled new proposals for improving Europe's single market in services on Wednesday. They said it would cut red tape and meet many of Britain's demands for better market access for its large services sector."
Euroskeptic extraordinaire Nigel Farage replied in an editorial published in the Telegraph in his usual style: a whole lot of the Union Jack accompanied the notion that Britain doesn't need Norway's model, but rather could build one all of its own:
"But I don't want a Norwegian deal. Or an Icelandic one for that matter. I believe in Britain. A Britain outside of the EU with an exciting future ahead of it. A proud, patriotic country that has control of its borders, represents itself on the world stage and makes its own laws in our own sovereign Parliament. I believe in a new British deal once we leave the EU, one that suits the needs of our own country."
For now, Farage, the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party, left us rather short on details.
In Kosovo, a milestone: With no shortage of controversy, or of expected difficulties ahead, Kosovo this week signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union.
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