Hard power has not been in vogue since the Iraq War turned badly in about 2004. In foreign policy journals and at elite conferences, the talk for years has been about "soft power," "the power of persuasion" and the need to revitalize the U.S. State Department as opposed to the Pentagon: didn't you know, it's about diplomacy, not military might! Except when it isn't; except when members of this same elite argue for humanitarian intervention in places like Libya and Syria. Then soft power be damned.
The fact is that hard power is supremely necessary in today's world, for reasons having nothing to do with humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the Harvard professor and former government official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who, in 2004, actually coined the term "soft power" in an eponymous book, has always been subtle enough in his own thinking to realize how relevant hard power remains.
As I write, the two areas of the world that are most important in terms of America's long-term economic and political interests -- Asia and Europe -- are undergoing power shifts. The growth of Chinese air and naval power is beginning to rearrange the correlation of forces in Asia, while the weakening of the European Union in geopolitical terms -- because of its ongoing fiscal crisis -- is providing an opportunity for a new Russian sphere of influence to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, both challenges require robust diplomacy on America's part. But fundamentally what they really require is a steadfast commitment of American hard power. And the countries in these two most vital regions are not bashful about saying so.
Security officials in countries as diverse as Japan and Poland, Vietnam and Romania desperately hope that all this talk about American soft power overtaking American hard power is merely that -- talk. For it is American warships and ground forces deployments that matter most to these countries and their officials. Indeed, despite the disappointing conclusions to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, rarely before has American hard power been so revered in places that actually matter.
Asia is the world's demographic and economic hub, as well as the region where the great sea lines of communication coalesce. And unless China undergoes a profound political and economic upheaval -- of a degree not yet on the horizon -- the Middle Kingdom will present the United States with its greatest 21st century competitor. In the face of China's military rise, Japan is shedding its quasi-pacifistic orientation and adopting a positive attitude toward military expansion. In a psychological sense, Japan no longer takes the American air and naval presence in Northeast Asia for granted. It actively courts American hard power in the face of a territorial dispute with China over islands in the East China Sea. Japan knows that, ultimately, it is only American hard power that can balance against China in the region. For South Korea, too, American hard power is critical. Though the South Korean military can ably defend itself against North Korea's, again, it is America's air and naval presence in the region that provides for a favorable balance of power that defends Seoul against Pyongyang and its ally in Beijing. As for Taiwan, its very existence as a state depends on the American military's Pacific presence.
Don't tell officials in the Philippines that American hard power is any less relevant than in previous decades. Like Japan, after years of taking the U.S. Navy and Air Force for granted, Manila is literally desperate for American military support and presence against China, with which it disputes potentially resource-rich islands and geographical features in the South China Sea. Like Japan and South Korea, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States: that is to say, these countries matter. As for Taiwan, it is arguably one of the finest examples of a functioning democracy in the world beyond the West, as well as geopolitically vital because of its position on the main sea lines of communication. Thus, Taiwan too, matters greatly.
Vietnam, for its part, has emerged as a critical de facto ally of the United States. It is the single most important Southeast Asian country preventing China's domination of the strategically crucial South China Sea. And what is Vietnam doing? It is refitting Cam Ranh Bay as a deep-water harbor, officially to attract navies from India, Russia and elsewhere; but especially to attract the U.S. Navy.