Finally, al-Qaeda does not have as strong a foreign character in Yemen as it did in previous conflicts. This reduces Washington and Sana's ability to separate the population from the terrorist group by using national pride, ethnic/tribal differences, or simple xenophobia to rebuff AQAP's advances.
REPULSED BUT NOT REJECTED
Last year, in response to AQAP's gains, the Yemeni military launched widespread operations against the group's forces in the south. Although these efforts were largely successful in pushing AQAP out of areas it overran in 2011, the group continues to pose a threat. Having retreated to its traditional safe havens in the interior, al-Qaeda has since undertaken a concerted assassination campaign against Yemeni security, military, and intelligence officials as it reconstitutes its forces.
In addition, the group still commands sympathy and influence in the south. To be sure, AQAP eventually reverted to harsh rule in many communities once it consolidated power there, alienating many locals and spurring the exodus of thousands from areas under its sway. Yet many others remain sympathetic to the group, not just for religious or culturally conservative reasons, but also out of a general feeling that al-Qaeda, with all its imperfections, is still a better alternative than the Yemeni government.
Although relief efforts for war refugees did much to improve Sana's image among southerners, only a sustained governance and development initiative -- one highly synchronized with military clearing and holding operations against AQAP -- will consolidate support for the central government. Yet this sort of initiative will not come naturally to Sana or Washington. The lack of such efforts following last year's clearing operations is already undermining popular support, creating another opportunity for a chastened but resilient AQAP to leverage the south against the central government. The group is already adapting its community engagement strategy by apologizing for the excesses of its recent rule and making overtures to key local leaders to lay the groundwork for reasserting control.
U.S. OPTIONS
Thus far, most U.S. efforts against AQAP have been limited to counterterrorism operations, which are unable to address the fundamental issues prompting Yemenis to either tolerate the group's presence or actively support its goals. In fact, the heavy reliance on sometimes-inaccurate drone strikes has allowed AQAP to take advantage of U.S. and Yemeni mistakes and further bolster its support among the population.
Accordingly, Washington should supplement its counterterrorism efforts with a campaign to defeat al-Qaeda's soft power strategy, facilitating the expansion of central government services to areas where AQAP's influence is most developed. In particular, the United States should:
* Forward-deploy development and good-governance initiatives: Washington should decentralize its efforts along these lines, moving some programs from the capital to the countryside in partnership with provincial officials. This approach would mitigate some of the grievances that AQAP exploits, improve U.S. understanding of tribal dynamics outside the capital, and encourage Sana to match U.S. efforts and address local needs.
* Establish a U.S. consulate in Abyan province: AQAP formerly controlled this province, so establishing a consulate in the local capital of Zinjibar would be a symbolic rejection of the group's influence and a visible example of America's interest in fostering robust governance and development efforts in the provinces. It could also spur Sana to undertake more-dedicated efforts in southern and central Yemen.
* Establish a "Yemen Hands" program: To better leverage personal relationships with local leaders and central government officials, Washington should consider implementing a Yemeni initiative modeled after the "Afghan Hands" program. This would involve a select group of U.S. officials residing in the country for longer-than-normal rotations, allowing them to concentrate on developing deeper relationships with the Yemeni people and a greater understanding of the country's problems.
