Can Yoshihiko Noda survive longer as Japan's prime minister than any of his recent predecessors? At the end of August, the former finance minister became the sixth premier in five years - taking the reins of a country that had already spent more than a decade in the economic doldrums before it was struck by a tsunami and nuclear accident in March 2011. Whether Noda can stop the revolving door at the Japanese prime minister's office, the Kantei, will depend on how he tackles the biggest reconstruction effort in Japan since the Second World War, in the face of expanding public debt (now more than twice the size of GDP).
Noda became PM after the resignation of Naoto Kan, who lasted 15 months. He is the third since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) beat the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009 general elections, ending an almost uninterrupted 54 years of LDP rule. But the DPJ's efforts in government have left voters disillusioned with both main parties. In a recent opinion poll, nearly half of respondents favoured no party at all, and neither main party commanded the support of more than a quarter.
Kan's downfall
Noda's first task will be to overcome infighting within his own party, which contributed heavily to Kan's resignation. Kan's approval ratings stood above 60% when he came to office in June 2010, but his popularity took an immediate hit when he suggested doubling sales tax to 10%, to reduce the country's more than $10 trillion (904.08 trillion yen) public debt. There was little support for this measure and when the DPJ lost the July 2010 upper-house election, the LDP was able to veto it. Kan then faced a (failed) leadership challenge from Ichiro Ozawa, leader of the DPJ's largest faction, who criticised Kan for reneging on election pledges to rein in bureaucracy and cut spending.
In September 2010, Kan was also accused of bowing to Chinese pressure after a Chinese fishing boat attempted to ram a Japanese coastguard vessel in disputed waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Chinese crew was arrested but then freed after Beijing cut all high-level cooperation and stopped the export of rare earth minerals to Japan.
Such political squabbles were, however, overshadowed by the disaster on 11 March, when a massive earthquake struck off Japan's northeastern coast, creating a tsunami that killed at least 15,000 people and caused widespread damage, including to the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant. Explosions and meltdowns at Fukushima led to the evacuation of all dwellings within 20 kilometres and to widespread power outages. The government's response soon came under fire after it failed to satisfactorily deal with the Fukushima disaster or show how it would rebuild the devastated areas.
For almost three months, the government and TEPCO, the utility operating the plant, failed to officially acknowledge that three of the six Fukushima reactors had gone into meltdown. Radiation forecasts went unpublicised. Locals complained that they were getting mixed messages about permissible levels of radiation, leading to public confusion, while inspection of food for radioactivity proved flawed and inconsistent.
The lack of decisive leadership, resulting risk to public health and TEPCO's continuing problems in stabilising the reactors dealt a fatal blow to Kan's approval ratings, contributing to a significant change in Japanese attitudes towards nuclear power. Additionally, while clean-up after the tsunami has been swift, authorities have dithered on important decisions regarding reconstruction.
Former officials believe the government played down the disaster to limit the scope of expensive evacuations and head off public criticism of the nuclear industry, which has strong political ties. A regulatory shake-up has now begun, but more than 80,000 evacuees have not been rehoused and the reactors at the nuclear plant are still leaking radiation.
