As the Egyptian military council asserts control and begins to sketch plans for transition to civilian democracy, what comparisons can we make with similar transitions from authoritarian regimes in Spain, Portugal, Indonesia, Chile, Brazil, Turkey and Greece?
Regardless of the roots and specifics of an overthrown authoritarian regime, some characteristics are similar: severe repression or suspension of civil liberties; restriction or elimination of political parties; government controlled press and other media; atrophy of civil institutions; sham elections, often including plebiscites; secret police surveillance and exile or imprisonment of opposition leaders.
To the extent that we can compare the Egyptian situation with others in the last 30 years, we may be able to identify key decisions and transition points that will help us understand the dynamics affecting the events in Egypt.
Our analysis owes much to the work of Juan J. Linz and Nikoforos Diamandouros, who have written extensively on the problems and patterns of democratic transitions.
One particularly relevant category of authoritarian states, termed “sultanist” by Linz, are highly personalized, paternalistic, non-ideological regimes where associates, clan and family members have privileged economic and political positions and may (attempt to) accede to power. Examples of sultanist regimes include Syria under the Assads, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya under Gaddafi and Egypt under Mubarak.
Ideology, if present at all, is a façade that plays little or no role in the life of the regime. Suppression of opposition by secret police may be as vicious as in a totalitarian dictatorship, but is not rationalized and justified by ideology. The military is usually an arm of the regime and shares in the economic benefits it confers on its supporters and associates. Regime maintenance and personal enrichment of the ruling class are the objective.
A variation on these are the caudillo regimes of Franco in Spain, Pinochet in Chile, Papadopoulos in Greece, the generals in Brazil and the Evren regime in Turkey in the early 1980s, where military leaders intervened for the sake of "stability." Somewhere in the middle of this continuum are the personality-dominated regimes in Portugal under Salazar and Indonesia under Sukarno, where civilians posed as savior and founder of their countries respectively. Both were followed by military-led governments that eventually guided the transition to democracy.
Regardless of the genesis of these regimes, the military play a leading role in maintaining the power structure, even if in the background.
So what are the implications for post-Mubarak Egypt?
The Mubarak regime had many of the hallmarks of "sultanism": little or no ideology; elites who treat public and private interests and state assets as their preserve, leading to widespread corruption; economic stagnation and high unemployment; suppression of political expression and political parties Atrophy of civil institutions, including the law and courts, as well as intrusive monitoring of secondary and higher education; cooptation of foreign and domestic business groups through access to government contracts and other largesse, often self-reinforced by bribery and kickbacks; police and internal security forces personally loyal and accountable to the regime's leadership, mostly because of the economic and status benefits conferred on them.
The distinguishing characteristic of the military that is most significant in the transition to democracy is whether it has been able to retain an identity separate from the regime, a professionalism that owes loyalty to the nation and its people rather than solely or even predominantly to an existing government.
This "guardian of the nation" role for the military is apparent in the successful transitions in Indonesia and Portugal, where the military supported popular democratic movements and mass public protests. It also has been the rationale for periodic military intervention in Turkey on behalf of secularism. The Brazilian military never descended to the horrible human rights violations of Pinochet’s armed forces in Chile, nor was it seduced by privileged economic status derived from corruption.
Arguably, it was the professionalism of the younger military in Spain who rallied to King Juan Carlos to face down the attempted coup by the old guard military right-wing in 1981. It also bears noting that in Portugal and Greece, the military ceded power to civilians after disastrous defeats in Angola and Greece respectively.
The Egyptian military took a generally hands-off position during the protests, making it progressively clearer that it would not use force to keep Mubarak in power. It stationed itself in key positions to help maintain peaceful and orderly demonstrations and protect key sites, including the priceless cultural heritage in the Egyptian Museum on Tahrir Square. But it did not threaten to disperse demonstrators with force – in sharp contrast to the internal security police and hired thugs who early on tried to intimidate the protesters on orders of the regime.
Its actions and its public statements gradually indicated support for peaceful change rather than support for Mubarak. In this regard, it appears that the military wanted to be perceived as an honest broker interested in guiding transition, rather than in merely defending the regime. In the words of one astute observer: “If the military wants a role in the future, it can’t have blood on its hands.”
This might have been nothing more than skillful public posturing as the military leadership realized that maintaining Mubarak in power would require bloody suppression of the mass demonstrations as in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Or it might reflect an on-going power struggle within the military, and pragmatic interim actions to defuse what were clearly incendiary conditions. Or, it may reflect a genuine "guardian of the nation" mentality and not a regime role, with the military deciding that its over-arching interest is the general welfare of the people and not enrichment of the oligarchy (despite its own comfortable position during Mubarak’s rule).
Immediate actions by the military council in the few days since Mubarak resigned suggest it is tipping toward a guardian of the nation role. Things to look for include key decisions that helped prior democratic transitions in the other countries mentioned: call for and facilitate early elections, with broad participation from most or all kinds of political and social opinion; task the new parliamentary assembly with adoption of a new, legitimate constitution that respects standard democratic norms; lift “state of siege” or other “emergency conditions” which have justified internal repression by secret police; free all political prisoners; promise to return to civilian control after elections; reaffirm international agreements and obligations.
By reaffirming the peace treaty with Israel, regardless of how it is seen “in the street,” the council also acknowledged it is in the military’s interest - and in Egypt’s long-run national interest. Three decades of peace with Israel, after four disastrous wars in the previous two decades, have provided both sides with a welcome stability – even if the Mubarak regime diverted its benefits for personal aggrandizement and enrichment while the Egyptian people suffered with economic stagnation and internal repression.
The Egyptian military has announced a direction similar to other military-guided transitions from authoritarian rule to a more or less stable and consolidated democracy. In a world of instant mass communications and mobilization of “flash crowds” via social media, this transition will be the most closely monitored of all, as literally millions round the world watch for hints of internal dissention, or a return to the oppression of the past. This has been a nationalist, not an ideological, popular revolt that essentially forced the military to oust one of their own. Having promised a transition to democracy, the military council, not Mubarak, will now be held accountable.
