Over the past few years, one of the most unique and important relationships in the world has started to come to an end. For decades, Turkey and Israel forged ties that not only served both nations very well, but also showed that a Muslim and Jewish country could work together against authoritarian regimes to increase security in the Middle East. As these ties have frayed, Turkey has reached out to China, a worrisome sign that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is increasing his connection to other assertive regimes around the globe. This nascent relationship is a sign as well that Beijing is looking to play a larger role not only in far-flung places like Africa, but in some of the world's most geopolitically important states.
Turkey was the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel, in 1948, and the two states increased their diplomatic and security cooperation during the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish Armed Forces were particularly in favor of closer relations between Ankara and Jerusalem, as both Turkey and Israel faced threats from Syria and Iran over the past several decades. Turkey and Israel shared intelligence information, conducted joint training between their two militaries, and had a strong military arms sales relationship. Israel helped supply many of the Turkish Armed Forces' advanced equipment and also modernized many Turkish weapons systems. Ankara, for its part, allowed the Israeli Air Force to use Turkish airspace, which let Israel gather crucial intelligence on Syria, for example. Israel also was able to use Turkish airbases on a limited basis, thereby further extending the reach of Israeli military power.
Unfortunately, relations between Ankara and Jerusalem have deteriorated in recent years. Prime Minister Erdogan continued cooperation with Israel during the early years of his premiership, but as he has turned to embrace Syria and Iran in his foreign policy, he has also turned away from Israel. Mr. Erdogan has given different reasons for his decision to reduce Turkey's ties to Jerusalem, including the Palestinian issue and the 2008 Gaza conflict. He also famously walked off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009 during a debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres over Israeli military action in Gaza, and thereby received enormous acclaim in the Arab world.
Turkish-Israeli relations all but collapsed earlier this year, when in May, a Turkish-sponsored flotilla of ships attempted to run Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip. Israeli commandos boarded the flotilla and after being assaulted, fired into the crowd of protestors, killing eight Turkish activists. Ankara recalled its ambassador to Israel and canceled most bilateral meetings, as well as military exercises. Since then, Mr. Erdogan has refused to improve relations with Jerusalem, and just recently his government refused to invite Israel to an annual air force exercise traditionally conducted among Turkey, Israel and the United States.
All of this would be worrying enough, for good Turkish-Israel ties have helped keep the pressure on regimes from Syria to Iran in past years. Yet the current downturn in relations is made even worse by Mr. Erdogan's decision to reach out to yet another authoritarian power, one that currently has a tense, if not troubled, relationship with the United States and many of its neighbors. That power is China. And after refusing to hold its traditional air force exercise with Israel, Ankara instead invited the Chinese Air Force to do the joint maneuvers at the Konya airbase in central Anatolia.
These recent moves by the Turkish government should worry anyone who believes that it is important for Turkey to maintain its close ties with liberal nations like the U.S. and Israel. What is the rationale for Prime Minister Erdogan reaching out to China and its president, Hu Jintao? Earlier this year, Messrs. Erdogan and Hu agreed to form a "strategic partnership," aimed largely at increasing the bilateral trade between their two countries. Currently, Sino-Turkish trade totals $17 billion, but the two leaders want to increase that figure to $50 billion by 2015 and $100 billion by 2020. Yet clearly, the Sino-Turkish relationship is likely to deepen beyond increased trade. Conducting air exercises with the Chinese Air Force is yet another sign that Mr. Erdogan is fundamentally altering Turkey's foreign policy and security strategy, while possibly gaining influential Chinese support for cotinued pressure on Kurdish separatists.
As for Mr. Hu, increasing China's influence in Turkey is a shrewd strategy. In particular, Sino-Turkish military exercises can only worry Washington and Turkey's other NATO allies; how far will such activities go? Turkey is part of the consortium building the next generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which will have to carry the burden of being America's only front-line fighter aircraft in large numbers. Will Ankara invite PLA Air Force officials to watch F-35 testing and exercises once the Turkish Air Force gets the plane? Will PLA Air Force officers be allowed to test fly it? What other military sales might China make to Turkey in their enhanced relationship—ballistic missiles or advanced diesel submarines?
Similarly, will Ankara start to weigh in on the North Korean crisis, further adding to the Chinese and Russian voices that have scuttled any serious talk of sanctions or meaningful economic pressure on Pyongyang? Could Mr. Erdogan's ties to Iran somehow facilitate future North Korean-Iranian missile and possibly nuclear cooperation, even as Turkey begins to have its own civilian nuclear power plants built? Western policy analysts need to start considering the possible scenarios of greater Sino-Turkish ties and play out the ramifications of an enhanced anti-Western network of states.
If Mr. Erdogan chooses to increasingly ally himself with authoritarian regimes, such as China, Syria, and Iran, then Turkey will quickly find itself isolated from the liberal West. It will find itself less influential in the world, because it will be a partner of those countries that are increasing instability in the Middle East and Asia.
Such relationships will also lead many to question whether Turkey is going to continue to be as tolerant and open a society as in the past, since it is partnering with governments that oppress their minorities and impose state ideologies on their citizens. Continuing on this path will also send a message that Muslim and Jewish states cannot find common ground to work together for greater security, but that some democracies and authoritarian powers have joint interests in challenging the stability of the international system. This would be a blow to those who believe that Turkey should help preserve peace and improve liberal cooperation in the Middle East and the wider world.
This week, in response to the devastating Israeli forest fires, Ankara offered Jerusalem aid and firefighting planes. That's the right move, and Mr. Erdogan should reverse his recent course and move Turkey back towards its old and trusted partners.
