For much of the 19th Century, Imperial Britain and Imperial Russia thrust and parried across the searing deserts and towering peaks of Central Asia. Both sought raw materials and markets for their expanding factories. Each sought strategic advantage over the other: Russia as part of its relentless transcontinental expansion to the Pacific; Britain to protect the “jewel in the imperial crown” – India.
The khanates were absorbed into Russia. Britain settled for an Afghani buffer state. The focus moved east, where a weak China, unable to exercise control over its farthest borders and occasional vassals, created a power vacuum in the Himalayas, Tibet and Mongolia. Russian intrigue with the Dalai Lama triggered a British invasion of Tibet in 1904, but Russia could not respond, facing internal insurrections after being defeated by Japan.
Ever alert to opportunities to extend its influence, and taking advantage of weakness in the Ottoman Empire, Imperial Germany moved to secure access and trade with Mesopotamia and Persia, forcing Britain and Russia to settle their Central Asian rivalries and stand against German commercial and political incursions with a 1907 agreement. Russia and Britain, joined by France, now jousted with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the run-up to World War I. Round One of the Great Game was effectively over.
With the total collapse of the Ottomans after World War I, consolidation of British influence in a broad swath from the eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal, and eventual Soviet control over the Central Asian “republics” following the Russian civil war, the focus shifted to Middle Eastern oil. Regional machinations by a resurgent Germany in the 1930s led Britain and Russia to cooperate again to bar German ascendance – especially in Persia. Central Asia was peripheral to World War II theatres, but the underlying dynamics were submerged only temporarily by the global cataclysm.
Following World War II, Turkey became the eastern anchor of NATO and the western anchor for CENTO, Cold War alliances to keep the Soviets from expanding southward into the oil-rich Middle East. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and the reemergence of the Central Asian states rekindled the old dynamic, laying the groundwork for Round Two – another Great Game ranging over the same deserts and mountains.
The players this time around: Russia, China, the U.S. and the EU, plus regional powers Turkey and Iran, all vying for presence and influence in the Central Asian “stans” – reincarnations of the old khanates that had detoured through the Soviet “republics.” The stakes? Regional stability, and vast reserves of oil and natural gas rivaling the Middle East to the south and surpassing Russia to the north.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan enabled the U.S. to establish Central Asian supply bases and associated, albeit modest, military presence. Though triggering a nervous Russian response, the two powers appear to recognize that they share a common interest in combating the drug trade as well as radical jihadist movements that threaten regional stability and foster terrorism abroad.
Turkey has leveraged its ethno-linguistic ties to the region, and in September hosted a summit of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul which formally established a Turkic Cooperation Council. The final summit declaration emphasized the region’s role in “ensuring the energy security of Europe” and called for increasing pipeline capacity on the Turkish routes to Western Europe, to undermine Russia’s ability to turn off energy supplies.
Mimicking Turkey, Iran is also leveraging its historical ties to Persian-speaking groups in the region, especially Tajikistan. Iran is supporting power projects and transportation links from Tehran to China through the region. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is also close to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who must deal with a large Tajik population in northern Afghanistan and faces an uncertain future even before NATO withdraws. But the other Central Asian autocrats seem skeptical of the Iranians and their potential for Shiite Islamist agitation.
Wary of Tukey’s role because of the majority Turkic Uighurs in Xinjiang Province and their dream of “Greater Turkestan," China is spreading its influence in Central Asia through long-term natural-resource agreements coupled with development aid – especially transportation infrastructure. New pipelines will carry the region’s oil and gas to China, as well as Europe, and perhaps even India. Chinese and European interests coincide on stable energy sources, but they compete for share of those resources: China to fuel its booming development; Europe to reduce dependence on Russian energy which has been used as a political lever.
So Round Two of the Great Game is geo-economic as well as geopolitical. Europe is energy focused. Russia is trying to protect its position as energy supplier to Europe and block Islamic jihadism. While the U.S. continues to be preoccupied with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the war in Afghanistan, making its longer term vision cloudy at best.
Pakistan is sidelined by its internal instability as well as its rivalry with India. With energy needs similar to China’s, India is eyeing Central Asia but faces serious logistical and political issues, as pipelines would have to go through Afghanistan (unlikely until stabilized), Pakistan (unlikely because of historic enmity) or Iran (unlikely due to U.S. opposition).
China is the only modern great power that is pursuing a coordinated strategy in Central Asia: expand trade and secure natural resources of all sorts – especially energy - supported by a new web of highways and railroads linking the region to Beijing and Shanghai as well as Europe and the Middle East. For this, it now shares an interest in Central Asian stability rather than turmoil.
