Busting Myths in the Middle East
Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a New Direction for the U.S. in the Middle East
By Dennis Ross and David Makovsky
Viking, June 2009
Read a Q&A with author David Makovsky about his new book
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The Arab-Israeli conflict stands as a rebuke to the old cliché that “practice makes perfect.” Imperfection seems to rule no matter how much Washington practices at making peace.
In their book, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a New Direction for the U.S. in the Middle East, veteran practitioner Dennis Ross and analyst David Makovsky offer their take on why so many successive American administrations have come to grief in the Middle East, and what Washington can do to improve its chances for future success.
Given its scope and lucidity, the book would be required reading for anyone interested in the Middle East, but it is especially relevant given that shortly before its publication, Dennis Ross was tapped as Secretary of State Clinton’s point man on Iran and Persian Gulf issues. (Ross has since moved over to the White House for an expanded Middle East portfolio.)
In order for the U.S. to start down its new direction, the authors seek to dispel several myths about the region and the peace process that have waylaid previous travelers. While the book effectively dismantles these myths with a mix of first hand accounts and diplomatic history, it is itself a product of – if not a myth – than a conventional wisdom about America’s interests in the Middle East. That conventional wisdom holds that because America relies on oil (only a fraction of which it actually imports from the Middle East) it has to take the lead in directing the region’s affairs.
The great irony of Myths, Illusions and Peace is that the authors prove quite convincingly that such a policy is largely unnecessary. In the opening chapters, the authors demolish the myth of linkage - the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian is the root of the Middle East’s problems. As the authors persuasively demonstrate, this just isn’t the case. Arab regimes pursue their own interests as they - not the Palestinians – define them. None of the fighting between the Israelis and Palestinians during the tumultuous past decade sparked regional instability, much less the toppling of any regimes.
Linkage is also bunk where it counts the most: oil. The Middle East’s oil pumpers used their oil weapon once, and despite the temporary pain it caused the U.S., it blew up in their face. As Ross and Makovsky recount, the Saudis eased off because they feared the consequence of the Iranians enriching themselves on expensive oil and ultimately valued their relationship with the U.S. more than pan-Arab symbolism and Palestinian solidarity. Other nations simply bought Middle Eastern oil and resold it the United States.
All of which raises an important question: if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn’t tied to any regional issues, if Arab states aren’t going to be destabilized by it and will continue to sell us oil regardless, why are we still mucking around in the Middle East? Ross and Makovsky seem to know they’ve undermined the argument for sustained American involvement and so they insist that the conflict constitutes a grievance that terrorists feed on. The resulting arguments take on a circular quality: we must intervene in the Middle East to offset the consequences of our intervention.
Given that the Obama administration hired Ross, it’s safe to assume the administration will continue to operate within the parameters of the conventional wisdom. In that case, the advice offered in Myths, Illusions and Peace seems eminently sensible. It is grounded in a modesty born of experience about what can be accomplished. Freedom and peace are not on the march in this book, but the authors do spell out in detail what first steps will be needed if the parties are to achieve any momentum.
Indeed, reading the book gives one the eerie sensation that the Obama administration is poised to run off the road. Contrast Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel’s brash assertion that there will be a final status agreement by the end of President Obama’s first term, to the authors insistence that peace cannot be foisted on the Israelis and Palestinians. Both publics need to be conditioned to make the trade-offs that would be necessary in any final status agreement, and neither the Israeli or Palestinian leadership have begun that difficult work. Rather than strong-arm Israel (the realists’ preferred solution) or ignore the Palestinians (the neoconservative innovation) the authors suggest a series of incremental steps that would bring immediate and tangible benefits to both publics, investing them in the more difficult steps to come. The U.S. role should simply be to see what both parties will bear, not declare at the outset what the resolution will be.
On Iran, the advice is similarly nuanced. Regime change won’t work in time to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Military strikes would be immensely dangerous. Yet the regime in Tehran won’t yield unless they fear for their life. The West must levy crippling sanctions or credibly threatening military force if a diplomatic solution is to bear fruit. Yet the authors also argue for direct engagement with Iran, conducted through a secret back channel.
Myths, Illusions and Peace also serves as an extended argument on behalf of keeping Israel central to American policy in the Middle East. The authors make a compelling case for Israel’s continued support on moral grounds but their argument tends to falter when it comes to the strategic returns – if only because the case is so obviously one-sided. The authors begin the book urging the U.S. to involve itself in peace making because of the terrorist-fueling anger produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict, then end by saying Israel is a strategic boon to the U.S. because it is a “bulwark” and a “deterrent” against radicalism. So which is it?
The authors also argue that since 1973 when the U.S. threw its full weight behind Israel, America has become “the decisive diplomatic player” in the “oil-laden Middle East.” Again, one wonders how valuable this coin really is. The authors have already explained that the Arab states won’t stop selling us oil, they’ve said we shouldn’t use our decisive diplomatic leverage to force the parties to the table, and they’ve said that even if we could solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it wouldn’t usher in a golden age. Sure, it’s nice to be wanted, but shouldn’t we expect a bigger payoff?
What’s more, several thousand Americans have been killed by Arab terrorists since the U.S. became the Middle East’s “decisive diplomatic player.” There have also been a number of American military interventions, bombings and wars in the region since 1973- in Libya, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq. Maybe those developments are totally unrelated to our deepening role in the region, or maybe they’re simply the unavoidable costs of securing oil. But they did happen. And yet, the authors barely acknowledge this history, let alone add it to the strategic ledger.
Nevertheless, Myths, Illusions and Peace charts what can best be described as a fairly centrist and sensible road for the U.S. in the Middle East. Unfortunately, it doesn’t have any exit ramps.
