Afghanistan: Policing as a Counterinsurgency Method

Like many others, I watched both President Obama and former Vice President Cheney as they staked out their respective positions on counterterrorism on television two weeks ago. The speeches made for good press, but had much less practical impact. Meanwhile, thousands of American men and women in uniform are moving into the Afghan theater where a significant increase in combat and casualties is about to occur. Not one word spoken during those speeches in Washington had any relevance to the many young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who are preparing for the mission that lies ahead. Both President Obama and former Vice President Cheney talked about Human Intelligence Operations, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in a manner that would indicate that they understand those subjects. I submit that they are both, at best, only marginally aware of what is occurring on the ground and what needs to be done to advance our interests.

Though I am more supportive of many of the positions made by Vice President Cheney, the reality is that the Bush administration’s record in Afghanistan was less than stellar in the end. Its record included the following: a failure to close on Bin Laden in Tora Bora when the opportunity presented itself; the inexplicable opening of an air corridor in December 2001 allowing the Pakistani Air Force to fly into Afghanistan and extract Taliban commanders from Konduz; a failure to immediately implement a broad program of economic and social development following the cessation of violence in 2002; and finally a complete failure to understand, develop and implement a program of policing as a counterinsurgency tool.

In addition to my early deployments of 2000 and 2001 in Afghanistan, I spent from June 2007 to June 2008 in eastern Afghanistan. Throughout that time, I was deeply disappointed by the failure of the U.S. government to employ policies and practices that addressed the challenges of an enemy that had penetrated deeply into the country and was transitioning to guerrilla and IED warfare. While in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008, I conducted over forty-four meetings and presentations in an effort to get the United States military to employ counterinsurgency programs that would have greater relevance to the threat at hand. I met with the U.S. Army brigade and division staffs to which I was assigned. I also met with the appropriate Task Forces, the Combined Security and Transition Command (CTSC) and even the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The levels of bureaucracy were horrifying and I found staff officers were averse to incurring any kind of risk. Little change was implemented. The result of all of this was an emboldened enemy and an extended conflict.

Now for the other side. It is difficult for me to believe that President Obama has made a commitment to exercising a strong and vibrant national defense. His campaign for the presidency smacked of leftist populism and included a healthy amount of criticism of those of us who have actually fought terror. Much support for him came from those who loathe the national security establishment. During the 2008 presidential campaign, I worked as a Veterans Coordinator for Senator John McCain. In a shopping center in Pennsylvania during the final days of the campaign, I—along with a seriously wounded veteran of the Iraqi conflict—chose to wear a “Veterans for McCain” t-shirt. We received one verbal insult after another from Obama supporters in language that I care not to print. I know passions run high in any election but what was said to us made clear that the service and sacrifice of our candidate or the service of any veteran meant little to many of Candidate Obama’s supporters. I would never have believed the insults and hatred had I not experienced it first hand.

Undeterred from these experiences, I have since done a dozen meetings on Capital Hill, at the Pentagon and with senior Obama administration officials. My aim again was to focus the administration on counterinsurgency strategies that will work in the Afghan theater of operations. I was pleasantly surprised to see that many officials were at least willing to meet and listen, though they appear no more capable of implementing functional counterinsurgency practices than their predecessors. Individuals in senior positions are waiting for orders from the very top. Unfortunately, initiative seems to have been wrung out of those who inhabit the national security establishment regardless of political party or persuasion. In counterinsurgency the simple adding of forces—as Obama plans to do this summer with the addition of 17,000 troops—does not make an effective program. In the end, progress will be determined only by the growing participation and competency of sustainable Afghan counterinsurgency forces.

A successful model to date has been this: Afghan National Army battalions paired with U.S. Special Forces teams that supervise Afghan National Army training and then accompany them on combat operations. These combined elements have become highly functional and lethal on the battlefield. In contrast, the Afghan National Police (ANP) lack credible specialized units to work against militants and IED networks. The creation of such units—with special pay, money for informant operations, basic technology, U.S. trainers and most importantly U.S. team leaders—would radically change the struggle across the country. Properly trained U.S. civilian police need to be assigned to the Afghan National Police for the purpose of conducting operations from within the ANP chain of command. Such inclusion of U.S. personnel in counterinsurgency-focused units would match U.S. leadership and resources with Afghan local linguistic and cultural knowledge. It would make an enormous difference in an organization that lost well over 1,000 men last year. Though this program alone will not win the war, it will provide a framework from within which other civilian programs can be established.

Assignment to the ANP would be challenging and dangerous for those who step forward. To date, civilian advisors conduct basic police training. It is time to move beyond that. I have heard a lot of criticism in the press about military contractors who are often labeled as mercenaries. But a good number of those contractors serving as police trainers do so not because of the money. They do so because their sons and daughters, nieces and nephews and neighbors are fighting in Afghanistan. Of the six such advisors in my brigade from 2007 to 2008, four of us had a combined total of seven children serving in the military—all of them either in theater or on their way.

The Obama administration can turn this conflict around more quickly, while spending less and limiting the deployment of additional combat forces. But it will require the adoption of a refined counterinsurgency policing strategy. The shameful and painful truth about Afghanistan is that a sizable number of American troops are dying needlessly. As someone with much experience over several decades in Afghanistan and in counterterrorism, I am most disturbed by the total lack of urgency or good sense by our national security apparatus, in general, and within the Department of Defense, in particular, in addressing these losses. And I am in no way comforted or reassured by speeches such as those given by President Obama and former Vice President Cheney. Republicans and Democrats alike would do the nation a service by focusing not on what has happened in the past but rather participating in the development of a tailored strategy to win in Afghanistan today.