U.S. Engagement of Iran Is Futile

In his presidential campaign, Barack Obama pledged that he will pursue direct negotiations with Iran. Since assuming office, he has set out to fulfil that promise by taking confidence-building measures. President Obama sent a video message to the Iranian people and the leaders of the Islamic Republic on the eve of Newroz. The Obama administration also invited Tehran to take part in the recent Afghanistan Conference in The Hague.

No doubt, international conflicts should be resolved peacefully and through negotiations rather than through the use of force. In that sense, the Obama administration's outreach to Iran appears to be sensible. In addition, there is strong support for such an approach in the international community.

However, engaging Iran will turn out to be an outdrawn process with no positive outcomes for either the U.S. or the international community. Such a process will only serve the interests of the theocracy in Tehran. This is a warranted prediction given previous attempts by the U.S. to engage Tehran. The first Bush administration attempted to reach out to the "pragmatic" Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. The Clinton administration pursued a policy of rapprochement with Tehran when Mohammad Khatami, the "reformist," was president. None of those efforts bored fruit. Even during the second term of the previous administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tried, on a number of occasions, to reach out to Tehran - but with no result.

Ultimately, however, one needs to rely on an adequate understanding of the tactical moves and strategic objectives of the Islamic Republic to realize that engaging Tehran will prove futile.

Few people seriously doubt that Iran's true intention with its nuclear program is the development of nuclear weapons. But many analysts and officials in Europe and the U.S. assume that Iran seeks nuclear weapons for defensive purposes only. U.S. military presence in the Gulf, the previous administration's labelling of Iran as part of an Axis of Evil and its doctrine of pre-emption, among others, are sited as reasons for Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent.

Furthermore, Tehran's support for radical Islamic groups in the Middle East and its policy of hindering peace between the Palestinians and Israel are seen as mere tactical means to compensate for its lack of "strategic depth".

Such an assessment of Iran's tactical and strategic policies overlooks the fact that the theocracy has had, every since its foundation, pursued ideologically expansionist and militarily offensive goals. Beside the fact that Tehran had developed a secret nuclear program for 18 years when it was revealed in 2002 - that is, long before growing U.S. military presence in the Gulf and the Bush administration's doctrine of pre-emption - its reliance on terrorist proxies dates back to the beginning of the 1980's. Since then, Tehran has expanded its network of terrorist proxies - most recently to Iraq.

Iran has also consistently attempted to undermine various regimes in the Middle East, even those that are Islamic, with the aim to replace them with theocracies in its own image. Whereas most of the Arab countries have pursued better relations with Israel, Tehran has portrayed itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause with the twin aim of turning public opinion in the Arab countries against their governments and to hinder a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian issue.

If one takes into account the ideological pronouncements of the theocracy in Tehran and their correlation with its actions during the past three decades in the Middle East and beyond, one will reach the conclusion that its strategic objective is none but ideological expansion and regional dominance.

As far as the nuclear issue is concerned, Iran has made continues progress in enriching uranium. The fact that the theocracy, in spite of three rounds of international sanctions, is bent on continuing the enrichment process is testament of its determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Its rejection of generous incentives by P5+1 is yet another indication of that. Nor is there any reason to believe that Tehran will end its support for radical Islamic groups in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, or reverse its policy of hindering peace between the Palestinians and Israel.

In addition, in response to President Obama's call for direct talks, Tehran has demanded that the U.S. "changes its behavior". Iran demands that the U.S. withdraws its forces from the Middle East, ends its alliance with Israel and gives Tehran free leeway in developing its nuclear program. Not surprisingly, the Iranian representative at the conference in The Hague attributed the problems in Afghanistan to the presence of U.S. forces in that country.

In fact, Iran has been emboldened by what it sees a strategic failure by the U.S. in Iraq. The same goes for Israel's wars with Hezbollah and Hamas during the past years. Furthermore, President Obama's announcement to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq has boosted Iran's perception of itself as the "victor" and the U.S. as the "loser" in the Middle East. Iranian officials' frequent visits to Iraq in the last couple of months indicate Tehran's overt efforts to prepare for filling the vacuum that will emerge following the departure of U.S. forces.

Consequently, the timing now for engaging Iran is the worst possible. An emboldened Iran perceives the Obama administration's offer of direct negotiations as a sign of weakness and will only use them to buy time for its nuclear weapons program. When the U.S. and the rest of the international community come to realize this, it will be too late.